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Abstract
Regulatory focus theory distinguishes between two independent structures of strategic inclina-
tion, promotion versus prevention. However, the theory implies two potentially independent defini-
tions of these inclinations, the self-guide versus the reference-point definitions. Two scales (the
Regulatory Focus Questionnaire [Higgins, E. T., Friedman, R. S., Harlow, R. E., Idson, L. C.,
Ayduk, O. N., & Taylor, A. (2001). Achievement orientations from subjective histories of success:
Promotion pride versus prevention pride. European Journal of Social Psychology, 31, 3–23] and
the General Regulatory Focus Measure [Lockwood, P., Jordan, C. H., & Kunda, Z. (2002). Moti-
vation by positive and negative role models: Regulatory focus determines who will best inspire us.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 854–864]) have been widely used to measure dispo-
sitional regulatory focus. We suggest that these two scales align respectively with the two definitions,
and find that the two scales are largely uncorrelated. Both conceptual and methodological implica-
tions are discussed.
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1. Introduction
Regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) distinguishes between two modes of motiva-
tional regulation, termed promotion and prevention focus, which respectively emphasize
attention to desires and potential gains and attention to obligations and potential losses.
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This framework of motivational processes has been highly influential, and has been impli-
cated in such widely ranging effects as the complexity of language use (Semin, Higgins, de
Montes, Estourget, & Valencia, 2005), the accuracy of estimates of probability (Brockner,
Paruchuri, Idson, & Higgins, 2002), and the initiation of goal related activity (Freitas,
Liberman, Salovey, & Higgins, 2002).
Despite the ubiquity and utility of regulatory focus theory, questions remain about
both this construct and its measurement. Conceptually, the seminal statement of regula-
tory focus (Higgins, 1997) presented two distinct conceptualizations of regulatory focus:
the self-guide definition, based on whether goals are derived from an attention to desires
versus obligations, and the reference-point definition, based on the end-state to which cur-
rent goal progress is compared. Do these definitions in fact represent a single, unitary con-
struct? Methodologically, two distinct measures of regulatory focus have been used in
previous investigations: the regulatory focus questionnaire (RFQ, Higgins et al., 2001)
and the general regulatory focus measure (GRFM, Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda,
2002). Are these scales in fact measures of the same construct? The present research is
the first to directly examine these questions.
One conceptualization of regulatory focus, which we term the self-guide definition,
distinguishes promotion and prevention in terms of the degree to which two possible
‘‘self-guides’’ are used for regulation. In this definition, promotion emphasizes internal
standards, whereas prevention emphasizes external or socially based standards. Thus, in
the self-guide definition, promotion focus is defined in terms of a focus on achieving
personally important aspirations, ideals, and ambitions (i.e., an ‘‘ideal-self’’ guide). By
contrast, prevention is defined in terms of a focus on fulfilling duties, obligations, and
responsibilities that are conveyed from parents or other authority figures, or are intrinsic
to the adherence to social roles, such parenting or teaching (i.e., an ‘‘ought-self’’ guide).
The second definition of regulatory focus, which we term the reference-point definition,
distinguishes promotion and prevention focus on the basis of which of two possible end-
states is used in goal regulation. In this definition, promotion focus is defined as regulation
centering on the positive reference-point of a ‘‘gain’’ (i.e., a goal to reach a desirable or
pleasurable end-state and avoid the absence of these states), whereas prevention focus is
defined as regulation centering on the negative reference-point of a ‘‘loss’’ (i.e., a goal
to steer clear of an undesirable or unpleasant end-state and attain an absence of these
states). A promotion goal is thus accomplished when the current state matches the desired
state of a gain, whereas a prevention goal is accomplished when a state of non-loss has
been attained. Higgins (1997) emphasized that regulatory focus was orthogonal to an
alternative framework of motivation, approach and avoidance motivation. Both promo-
tion and prevention were argued to encompass approach of desired end-states (gains in
the case of promotion, and non-losses in the case of prevention) and avoidance of unde-
sired end-states (non-gains and losses, respectively). Similarly, whereas approach and
avoidance are closely related to positive and negative affect, respectively, promotion and
prevention were theorized to be independent of affective valence (Idson, Liberman, & Hig-
gins, 2000).
Just as two definitions of regulatory focus exist, two scales, the regulatory focus ques-
tionnaire (RFQ, Higgins et al., 2001) and the general regulatory focus measure (GRFM,
Lockwood et al., 2002), have dominated the literature. The RFQ was derived from a fac-
tor analysis of items assessing the history of individuals’ success at promotion and preven-
tion tasks over the course of their lives (see Higgins et al., 2001 for a complete discussion of
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the development and validation of this measure). In contrast, the GRFM, which origi-
nated as an ad hoc scale in research on motivation, is tailored to the participant popula-
tion of undergraduate students, emphasizing success and failure at academic goals. These
two scales have been used in a variety of recent investigations, but with little apparent
overlap in topic area. The RFQ has been shown to predict emotional outcomes, such as
guilt and coping (e.g., Camacho, Higgins, & Luger, 2003), cognitive outcomes, such as
persuasion and language use (e.g., Semin et al., 2005) and both mental and physical health
outcomes (e.g., Strauman et al., 2006). The GRFM, in contrast, has primarily been used in
investigations examining role models (e.g., Lockwood, Chasten, & Wong, 2005), and in
applied research (e.g., Yeo & Park, 2006). Despite their differences in content, develop-
ment, and applications, both scales share the limitation of being self-report measures
and thus are limited by the degree to which participants possess insight into their own
motivational state and experiences. Nonetheless, these scales represent the dominant
approach to measuring regulatory focus on the trait level, and the range of findings with
each scale suggests they possess adequate predictive validity.
An examination of the items in these two measures suggests that the RFQ primarily
centers on the self-guide conceptualization of ideals versus obligations, with a significant
portion of items dealing with parental interaction and other past self-guide experiences
capturing the obligation aspect of prevention focus. In contrast, the GRFM closely fol-
lows the reference-point definition, with items emphasizing academic achievement in the
present. Thus, the key theoretical question of this paper—whether the self-guide and ref-
erence-point definitions are empirically unitary—is paralleled by the methodological ques-
tion of how closely these two major self-report measures are related. In Study 1, we present
a principal components analysis of these two scales that shows that they load on distinct
factors, and that rather than being orthogonal to approach and avoidance (measured with
the BIS/BAS scale; Carver & White, 1994), the reference-point definition seems to overlap
it. In Study 2, we investigated whether this overlap was simply an artifact of the structure
of the GRFM, and, in Study 3, whether it extended to affect.
2. Study 1
2.1. Method
Five hundred and four University of Illinois undergraduates enrolled in an introductory
social psychology course participated in mass testing sessions in exchange for course
credit.
A pool of 48 items, representing the RFQ (Higgins et al., 2001), the GRFM (Lockwood
et al., 2002), and the BIS/BAS scale (Carver & White, 1994), were presented using 9-point
Likert scales. Items were anchored with endpoints ‘‘strongly disagree/strongly agree’’ or
with ‘‘never or seldom/very often’’, as appropriate based on item wording. Four forms
of the questionnaire were created to remove concerns about order effects on the items.
2.2. Results
Eigenvalues indicated that three factors adequately accounted for the correlation
matrix (eigenvalues = 9.57,7.58, and 4.42). A principal components analysis was per-
formed with a 3-factor solution specified, and the results subjected to varimax rotation.
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The first two factors corresponded to gain and loss. Sixteen items, deriving from all
three of the contributing scale sources, had loadings greater than .50 on the first factor.
These items made reference to positive outcomes, ambition, achievement, and success
(e.g., ‘‘In general, I am focused on achieving positive outcomes in my life’’; ‘‘I typically
focus on the success I hope to achieve in the future’’; ‘‘I feel like I have made progress
toward being successful in my life’’). Conversely, the 12 items showing loadings greater
than .50 on the second factor made reference to failure, loss, obligation, and anxiety
(e.g., ‘‘I often worry that I will fail to accomplish my academic goals’’; ‘‘I frequently think
about how I can prevent failures in my life’’; ‘‘I feel pretty worried or upset when I think or
know somebody is angry at me’’). The third factor had the strongest loadings by the subset
of RFQ items involving obedience (e.g., ‘‘Growing up, would you ever ‘cross the line’ by
doing things that your parents would not tolerate?’’).
This pattern of relationships was supported by the simple correlations between the three
component scales. The GRFM promotion subscale showed a higher correlation to the
approach subscale of the BIS/BAS (r = .55, p < .001) than to the RFQ promotion subscale
(r = .39, p < .001), t(497) = 3.56, p < .001. The correlation between the BAS and RFQ
promotion subscale was .32, p < .001. Similarly, the prevention subscale of GRFM was
more strongly related to the avoidance subscale of the BIS/BAS (r = .54, p < .001) than
to the prevention subscale of the RFQ (r = !.15, p < .01), t(497) = 21.7, p < .001. As
might be expected given that the RFQ prevention items loaded on a third, orthogonal fac-
tor, the correlation between the BIS and the RFQ prevention subscale was .05, n.s.
2.3. Discussion
Items corresponding to the ought-self-guide aspect of the self-guide definition did
appear to be orthogonal to the theoretically unrelated construct of approach and avoid-
ance; however, they were also orthogonal to all other regulatory focus items. (In fact,
the RFQ prevention subscale was actually negatively correlated with the GRFM preven-
tion subscale.) In contrast, the GRFM and the BIS/BAS loaded equally well on the first
two factors, suggesting that the two scales may tap into the same underlying construct.
The present study leaves open the possibility that this result is an artifact of the lack of
emphasis on non-gains and non-losses in the GRFM, as the principal components analysis
only reveals that two scales emphasizing gains and losses both load on factors correspond-
ing to gains and losses. In order to conflict with the reference-point definition, we would
have to find that items related to non-gains and non-losses were, respectively, correlated
with losses and gains, rather than showing the predicted pattern of a relationship between
gains and non-gains and between losses and non-losses. We tested precisely this issue in
Study 2, and also examined how these regulatory elements related to affect.
3. Study 2
Study 1 indicated an overlap between the predominately gain and loss focused subscales
of the GRFM and the BIS/BAS. In Study 2, we created a subset of non-gain and non-loss
items. The reference-point definition of regulatory focus would predict that items assessing
attention to non-gains and gains, representing promotion-failure and success, would be
highly correlated, as would items focused on non-losses and losses (prevention-failure
and success).
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3.1. Method
Sixty-nine University of Illinois undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology
course participated in computerized testing sessions in exchange for course credit.
Using the factor analysis results from Study 1, we assembled a subset of reference-point
items (5 promotion, 5 prevention), then rewrote them to manipulate their framing (success
vs. failure). Thus, 5 promotion items were framed in terms of success (gain), 5 promotion
items were framed in terms of failure (non-gain), 5 prevention items were framed in terms
of success (non-loss), and 5 prevention items were framed in terms of failure (loss). See
Table 1 for these four item sets. Items were presented in random order. Following these
reference-point items, participants completed the PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988), a well-established measure of positive and negative affectivity; these items were also
ordered randomly.
3.2. Results
The promotion scale framed as a success (i.e., a gain) did not correlate with the promotion
scale framed as a failure (i.e., non-gain), r = !.09, n.s. Similarly, the prevention scale framed
in terms of failure (i.e., loss) did not correlate with the prevention scale that was framed in
terms of success (non-loss), r = !.01, n.s. In contrast, the promotion-success (gain) and pre-
vention-success (non-loss) subscales correlated substantially, r = .41, p < .001, as did the
promotion-failure (loss) and prevention-failure (non-gain) subscales, r = .53, p < .001.
This pattern continued into the relation of these four scales with positive and negative
affectivity. Whereas promotion-success (gain) was positively correlated with positive affect
Table 1
Reference-point subscales (Study 2)
Gain (a = .82) Non-gain (a = .67)
Right now, I am focused on achieving positive
outcomes
Right now, I am concerned about missing out on
positive outcomes
I typically focus on the success I hope to achieve in the
future
I frequently worry that my future will be less successful
than I hope
I frequently imagine how I will achieve my hopes and
aspirations
I frequently imagine how I might fall short of my hopes
and aspirations
When good things happen to me, it affects me strongly When good things fail to materialize, it affects me
strongly
I see myself as someone who is primarily striving to
reach my ‘‘ideal-self’’—to fulfill my hopes, wishes,
and aspirations
I see myself as someone who has trouble reaching my
‘‘ideal-self’’ (fulfilling my hopes, wishes, and
aspirations)
Non-loss (a = .68) Loss (a = .66)
I am generally sure that I can bypass negative events
in my life
I frequently think about how I can prevent failures in
my life
I am confident that I can meet my responsibilities and
obligations
I am anxious that I will fall short of my responsibilities
and obligations
Right now, I am focused on protecting myself against
negative outcomes
Right now, I am focused on avoiding negative
outcomes
I am generally good at avoiding careless mistakes I worry about making mistakes
I often imagine myself successfully preventing bad
things from happening to me
I often imagine myself experiencing bad things that I
fear might happen to me
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(PA), r = .48, p < .001, reframing it into promotion-failure (non-gain) reversed the corre-
lation with PA (r = !.31, p < .001). Similarly, the correlation with negative affect (NA)
shifted from !.16 (n.s.) for promotion-success to .52 for promotion-failure, p < .001.
When prevention-failure (loss) was reframed into prevention-success (non-loss), the corre-
lation with NA shifted from .50 (p < .001) to .20 (n.s.), whereas the correlation with PA
shifted from .01 (n.s.) to .28 (p = .02).
3.3. Discussion
Study 2 indicates that the overlap of the GRFM and the BIS/BAS subscales in Study 1
was not a mere artifact of the GRFM, but may instead represent a deeper issue with the
reference-point definition of regulatory focus. Not only is attention to losses not related to
the use of an ought-self-guide (Study 1), but it is unrelated to non-losses and correlated
with attention to non-gains, in contrast to the defining reference-point structure. More-
over, far from being unrelated to affective valence, we found that the four reference-point
subscales bore significant relations to affectivity. In Study 3, we tested whether the estab-
lished measures, the RFQ and the GRFM, showed this same relationship to affectivity.
4. Study 3
In Study 1, we found that the GRFM and RFQ did not relate as would have been
expected if the reference-point and self-guide definitions represented a unitary construct.
Given the unexpected associations of our four subscales with affectivity in Study 2, we
examined in Study 3 whether either scale violated the principle that regulatory focus is
independent of valence.
4.1. Method
Forty-one University of Illinois undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology
course participated in computerized testing sessions in exchange for course credit. Items
from the RFQ and GRFM scales were interspersed and presented in random order; par-
ticipants then completed the PANAS, items of which were also presented in random order.
4.2. Results and discussion
The GRFM promotion subscale and the PANAS positive affect (PA) subscale were sig-
nificantly correlated, r = .31, p < .05, as were the prevention and negative affect (NA) sub-
scales, r = .39, p = .01. Neither promotion and PA nor prevention and NA were
significantly related for the RFQ (rs = .27,!.26, ps = .09, .10). As in Study 1, then, the
GRFM was significantly related to constructs which are theoretically orthogonal to regu-
latory focus.
5. General discussion
The GRFM and the RFQ are both billed as measures of individual differences in reg-
ulatory focus, yet participants’ responses on the two measures are largely unrelated. We
suggest that this stems from the existence of two potentially independent definitions of
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regulatory focus, which are each assessed by one of these respective scales. The GRFM
focuses on the reference-point definition, whereas the RFQ focuses on the self-guide def-
inition. On a conceptual level, this dissociation of these measures suggests that the two def-
initions of regulatory focus may represent two unique constructs, rather than a single
phenomenon. In particular, our results raise questions about the validity of the refer-
ence-point definition. We found in two studies that both an existing scale, the GRFM,
and a newly constructed scale that included non-losses and non-gains both showed an
unexpected correlation with affect (as well as between losses and non-gains, and non-losses
with gains, in the case of the new measure).
A true assessment of the validity of the reference-point definition is well beyond the
scope of this brief note, though we strongly encourage future programmatic research to
investigate it. However, we do feel safe in strongly cautioning researchers interested in reg-
ulatory focus to exercise caution in selecting a scale and interpreting the results of both
present and prior research. In particular, researchers should be aware that the refer-
ence-point-based GRFM functions much more like a measure of approach and avoidance
(the BIS/BAS) than like the RFQ, which is closer to the self-guide definition. Moreover,
given the lack of association between the two measures, results obtained with the RFQ
may not extend to the GRFM (and vice-versa). For example, although we replicated
the findings of Idson et al. (2000) that the RFQ was not related to affect valence, we found
that the GRFM was significantly associated with positive and negative affectivity.
In fact, we would suggest that the difference between the GRFM and the RFQ pivots
on affect. When defined in terms of reference-points, as in the GRFM, promotion focus is
associated with positive affectivity, whereas prevention focus is associated with negative
affectivity. Moreover, this connection was not a simple artifact of the GRFM’s structure.
When we reframed a subset of items to balance across success vs. failure within both pro-
motion and prevention, the pattern of relations to affectivity remained but simply reversed
in direction. Although this may be a function of linguistic limitations of both writing and
responding to items, it appears difficult to disentangle the reference-point definition of reg-
ulatory focus from affectivity using self-report measures. Indeed, if the connection stems
from outcome valence and affect being processed by the same brain systems, as proposed
by Gray (1990), disentanglement may be impossible (cf. Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson,
1999). Thus, whenever researchers draw conclusions on the basis of reference-point mea-
sures, they must be mindful of the fact that their findings will contain significant variation
in affectivity. A particularly cautious reading of these data would say that any individual
difference measurement of reference-point focus will necessarily involve measurement of
emotional tendencies, in violation of the original conceptualization of regulatory focus
theory. Researchers concerned by this association would be wise to focus instead on the
self-guide definition.
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